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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant/Appellant filed his notice of appe^- ^~ Mrrr 16. 2011
'Notitv of Xppt'iil was lllnl on M;is I "' MHI I

\r. \mended

llio I Utah Sijpi\ me ( 'ontl has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A^3-102.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

•.

•

. \:. w . ., pc.iaiit s KUIC bU[b • Mono:- i ) N-et

Aside the Default Judnnvn:'* ' R. 553-355.;
2.

Did the district court err in denying Appellant's Rule 13(d) Motion for

Leave to File a Counterclain I? (R. 548 550.)
S I A IN I) i.R DUE KEN IENN
Issue #li

A trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment

.;] ojws inc •:*.i. U/UM ^ discretionary power and will be overturned only if it has abused

Issue #2: A UiaA court's ruling on a inoiiuii lui I* ^ - * *

*^ • mi is

question of law. Questions of law are reviewed for coixectness with no defexence given
In I IK IMIII t.Miirl ,SVi//. • r /lunwm, 'Ml! |\Jd | I1),1,, | !>»») (Utah l^9>).
DETERMINATIVE HI H,ES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure H)(b» is determinative of the first issue. Utah Rule
of < Vvil Pioeeduiv Li is determinative oi the second issue. These rules are set out in the
addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter concerns an easement over the property of Appellant, Zdenek Sorf,
and the ordered removal of landscaping, rock retaining walls, a gazebo, hot tub,
buildings, trees and a water feature following a default judgment. The easement relates
to the Salt Lake Aqueduct owned and operated by the Appellee, Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("District"). The claimed easement was granted to the
i

District in 1946 for the purpose of operating and maintaining the Salt Lake Aqueduct
pipeline. In 1952, the easement was transferred to the United States Department of
Interior. In 2006, the easement was conveyed back to the District. Since receiving the
easement back, the District has dramatically expanded the scope of the easement through
rules and regulations imposed by it that limit and restrict property owners. The rules and
regulations were not mentioned in, nor were they part of the original easement. The
claimed easement is 120 feet wide and runs through a large majority of Mr. Sorf s
backyard and even included a corner of his house. Shortly after this appeal was initiated,
the District suddenly abandoned the portion of the easement that includes Mr. Sorf s
home.

(Ex. B of Supplemental Record, accepted by the Court on 10/28/11.) The

remaining easement area now begins immediately outside Mr. Sorf s backdoor and
covers most of his backyard.
In October 2010, a complaint was filed seeking a determination of the District's
rights and authority to Mr. Sorf s property. Specifically, but not exclusively, the District
sought a determination as to the enforcement of multiple rules and regulations that were
adopted by the District more than 58 years after the initial granting of the easement. (R.
2
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5.) A Summons and Complaint was left at Mr. Sorf s home, but not personally served on
him. At the same time frame, Mr. Sorf received a letter from the District soliciting
contact and resolution to the dispute. Mr. Sorf contacted the District to try and facilitate a
resolution. He did not understand he had been sued or that he was required to answer.
Due to his mistaken understanding, a default judgment was entered against Mr. Sorf on
December 16, 2010. (R. 97.) The default judgment requires Mr. Sorf to remove all
structures, trees, a water feature, a hot tub, a gazebo, rock retaining walls and other
landscaping (which Mr. Sorf paid more than $150,000 to install). (R. 97-99.) In January
2011, Mr. Sorf retained counsel and initiated efforts to set aside the default judgment. On
February 3, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a proposed Answer to the District's Complaint and
asserted multiple meritorious defenses. (R. 125-134.) On March 17, 2011, Mr. Sorf s
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was denied. (R. 353-354.)

The

District argues Mr. Sorf should have recognized that a complaint had been filed.
However, he was mistaken and it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Mr. Sorf s
mistaken understanding to lead to the dramatic and costly implications imposed by the
default judgment. Mr. Sorf should not be deprived of all useful purpose of his backyard,
forced to remove hundreds of thousands of dollars of landscaping, and suffer a significant
loss in value of his home without the District's claims being determined on the merits.
Entry of the default judgment resulted in a final determination of the District's
rights and authorities over Mr. Sorf s property.

The terms of the default judgment

constitute a taking. In light of the taking that occurred, Mr. Sorf filed a Rule 13(d)
Motion for Leave to file a counterclaim against the District for inverse condemnation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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(R. 374.) Mr. Sorf s claim for inverse condemnation was not acquired until after the
default judgment was finalized. The District's rights to Mr. Sorf s property had to be
defined before one could determine if a taking had occurred. On May 9, 2011 Mr. Sorf s
Rule 13(d) Motion for Leave to file a counterclaim was denied. (R. 527.) Mr. Sorf s
claims for inverse condemnation did not mature until after the default was finalized with
denial of the Motion to Set Aside. Mr. Sorf should not be stripped of his recognized and
bona-fide claims for inverse condemnation just because default was entered on earlier
issues. To preclude Mr. Sorf from pursuing his claims for inverse condemnation would
be an additional penalty arising from the default. Fundamental justice does not allow
such punishment. Mr. Sorf should be given the opportunity to assert claims for inverse
condemnation against the District.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Salt Lake Aqueduct
1.

On February 4, 1946, Elizabeth Colemere conveyed and warranted to the

District "a perpetual easement to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain a pipeline
or pipelines on, over and across [specifically] described property in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah" (which is now the appellant's property). The original warranty deed was a
simple two page document that did not include any regulations, restrictions or limitations
as to use of property. (R. 39-40.)
2.

On August 22, 1952, a Warranty Deed of Easement was entered between

the District and the United States of America. The District conveyed to the United States
Department of Interior a "perpetual easement to construct and reconstruct, operate and
4
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maintain an underground pipeline and appurtenant structures, which latter may be
situated above ground surface, on, over or across [specifically] described property
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah." When the easement was conveyed to the
United States, it did not include any restrictions or limitations as to use of property. (R.
48-49.)
3.

During the time the easement was held by the United States Department of

Interior, individuals were not restricted from building significant

and costly

improvements on the easement area including, but not limited to, homes, swimming
pools, tennis courts, etc. (Hearing Transcript at pp. 5-8, starting at R. 556.)
4.

On October 2, 2006, the United States Department of Interior, through a

quitclaim deed, conveyed all interests in the SLA to the District. When the easement was
deeded back to the District, it did not include any restrictions or limitations as to use of
property. (R. 43-47.)
5.

Since receiving the easement back, the District has adopted rules and

regulations expanding the easement and significantly limiting how property owners can
and cannot use property within the easement area. The scope of the restrictions is left to
the unilateral discretion of the District. The restrictions were not included in the original
easement, the conveyance to the United States, or the return of the easement to the
District. The restrictions were created unilaterally by the District more than 58 years
after the easement was originally granted. (R. 417-428.)
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

{

Mr. SorFs Residence
6.

Mr. Sorf lives at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road (2250 East) in Sandy,

Utah. (R. 10 at Tf 27.) He has resided in his residence for nearly 24 years. The SLA
easement covers the majority of Mr. Sorf s backyard and even extended into the
southeast corner of his house. (R. 430-432.) After this appeal was initiated, the District
abandoned the portion of the easement that included Mr. Sorf s house. The easement still
in effect begins immediately outside of Mr. Sorf s backdoor. (Ex. B of Supplemental
Record, accepted by the Court on 10/28/11.)
7.

Several large trees, rocks and brush were located on the SLA easement in

Mr. Sorf s backyard before Mr. Sorf bought his property in 1988. (R. 434 at «| 4.) Two of
the trees were at least 60 feet tall. (R. 435 at f 5.) (See also Ex. 9 & 10 of Ex. A of
Supplemental Record, accepted by the Court on 10/28/11, showing the large size of the
tree, stump and roots associated with one of the removed trees.)
8.

A small shed was also located on the easement prior to the time Mr. Sorf

purchased his home. (R. 435 at f 6.)
• 9.

For at least twenty years after Mr. Sorf purchased his home, no one ever

expressed any concern with the trees, rocks, patio, brush and shed being located on the
SLA easement. (R. 435 at If 8.)
10.

During the nearly twenty-three years Mr. Sorf has lived in his

neighborhood, he has observed and continues to observe concrete pads, driveways, large
trees, cinder block walls, rock walls, sheds, and other structures and objects over the SLA
easement in his neighbors' property. (R. 435 at If 9, Ex. F; see also picture of large tree,
6
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driveway and other large objects over the SLA easement across the street from Mr. Sorf s
property, R. 444; picture of a stake, placed by District, in front of the cinderblock wall
identifying the western edge of the easement and demonstrating that Mr. Sorf s neighbor
has large trees over the easement, R. 446; picture of a stake, placed by District,
identifying the western edge of the easement and demonstrating that approximately 5 to 6
feet of Mr. Sorf s neighbor's house and foundation are on the SLA easement, R. 448; and
Ex. 7 & 8 of Ex. A of Supplemental Record, accepted by the Court on 10/28/11.)
11.

In approximately March 2009, Mr. Sorf began improving his backyard. (R.

436 at 112.)
12.

Mr. Sorf removed the large trees, rocks and brush from the easement and

graded the dirt but did not bring new dirt onto the property. (R. 436 at | 13, Ex. F; see
also picture of the tree stump from one of the trees Mr. Sorf removed, and where the
gazebo and hot tub are now located, R. 450.)
13.

Based upon instruction that was given by the District's representatives, Mr.

Sorf purposely did not place any structures directly over the pipeline. (R. 436 at | 14.)
14.

The small storage shed that is on the SLA easement existed prior to the

time Mr. Sorf purchased the property and is approximately twenty-six (26) feet from the
pipeline. (R. 436 at f 16.)
15.

Mr. Sorf placed a hot tub in the spot where he tore out one of the large

trees. (R. 436 at | 17; Ex. 9 of Ex. A of Supplemental Record, accepted by the Court on
10/28/11.)
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16.

Mr. Sorf s hot tub and gazebo are located approximately forty-eight (48)

feet from the pipeline. (R. 436 at 118.)
17.

The garden boxes for vegetables are located approximately thirty-one (31)

feet from the pipeline and the water feature is approximately twenty-three (23) feet from
the pipeline. (R. 436 at f 20; Ex. 1 & Ex. 6 of Ex. A of Supplement Record, accepted by
the Court on 10/28/11.)
18.

The second shed on Mr. Sorf s property is located approximately forty-four

(44) feet from the pipeline. (R. 436 at ][ 21; Ex. 1 of Ex. A of Supplemental Record,
accepted by the Court on 10/28/11.)
19.

In November 2009, one of the District's employees visited Mr. Sorf at his

property. Mr. Sorf believes the employee's name was Lynn Coon. (R. 437 at | 22.) By
that time, a majority of Mr. Sorf s landscaping was finished, except for a few items such
as the rock sidewalk, grass, roof on the gazebo, fencing and a concrete pad in front of the
second shed. (R. 437 at ^f 23.)
20.

Mr. Coon did not instruct Mr. Sorf to cease landscaping nor did he explain

that Mr. Sorf needed permission from the District to continue. (R. 437 at f 24.) Instead,
Mr. Coon told Mr. Sorf that the landscaping should not interfere with the pipeline and
suggested that Mr. Sorf submit an application to the District indicating that he had
improved the property for the purpose of updating their records. (R. 437 at ^ 25.)
21.

Mr. Coon showed Mr. Sorf where he thought the easement boundaries on

the property were and instructed Mr. Sorf that he should not build or place any structures
directly over where the pipeline was located. (R. 437 at 126.)
8
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22.

Mr. Sorf would have immediately stopped landscaping had Mr. Coon

instructed him to cease activities or if he had told Mr. Sorf he was interfering with the
SLA pipeline. (R. 437 at 130.)
23.

The District placed a stop work order sign on Mr. Sorf s property after

improvements to the backyard were nearly complete. (Hearing Transcript at pp. 14 & 15,
starting at R. 556.)
24.

A tall cinder block wall with three foot foundations existed on the north

side of Mr. Sorf s property prior to the time he purchased his home approximately 23
years ago. (R. 438 at | 37.)
25.

The cinder block wall did not contain a gate or otherwise permit access to

that portion of the SLA easement on Mr. Sorf s property. (R. 438 at f 38.)
26.

Mr. Sorf tore down the tall cinder block wall and its three foot foundations

and installed a wood fence in its place. (R. 438 at 139.) After removing the cinder block
wall, the district requested Mr. Sorf to install a gate in the wood fence. This was the first
time in over 24 years that the District showed any interest in the activities being
conducted on or having access to Mr. Sorf s property. (Hearing Transcript at p. 6,
starting at R. 556.)
27.

In compliance with the District's request, Mr. Sorf installed an access gate

on the north side to allow the District access to the portion of the SLA easement on his
property. (R. 438 at f 40.)

9
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28.

Since the time Mr. Sorf has lived in his home, he has never observed

anyone performing any routine inspections of the portion of easement which crosses his
property until he tore down the cinder block wall. (R. 439 at f 43.)
Complaint
29.

The District filed a Complaint in this matter on October 28, 2010. (R. 5.)

30.

The District asked the Court to approve its rights and authorities in relation

to the SLA corridor and Mr. Sorf s property, including the imposition of pages and pages
of rules and regulations that were not part of the original easement.

The District

requested an order from the Court declaring its property rights and regulatory authority,
declaring it rights and powers to remove Mr. Sorf s improvements, and quieting the
District's title. (R. 16 at | 61.)
31.

The District sought the following relief:

Wherefore, [the District] requests an order and judgment as follows:
A.

Enjoining Defendant from interfering with [the District's]
restoration of the SLA corridor; and

B.

Enjoining Defendant from any future trespass upon [the
District's] property interests or violations of [District] regulations;
and

C.

Declaring [the District's] property rights; and

D.

Declaring [the District's] regulatory authority; and

E.

Declaring [the District's] right and power to remove Defendant's
improvements which infringe [District] property rights, or which
violate [District] regulations; and

F.

Quieting [District's] title; and
10
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G.

For damages suffered by [District] due to Defendant's actions,
including costs to be incurred in restoring the SLA corridor, together
with interest; and

H.

For costs incurred by [District] in this action; and

I.

For such other relief this Court deems appropriate and just.

(R. 17-18.)
32.

On October 28, 2010, a Summons and Complaint were delivered to Mr.

Sorf s residence. However, he was not home. A female at the residence was unwilling to
accept the papers. (R. 79.)
33.

Mr. Sorf received a letter from the District's counsel asserting that a

complaint and summons were enclosed, but he did not have the actual enclosures. (R.
114atf 3;R. 115 at If 4.)
34.

The letter indicated that the District was willing to discuss an amicable

resolution of the matter. (R. 114 at ^f 5 & R. 118.) Based on the letter, Mr. Sorf believed
that the District would refrain from filing a lawsuit if the parties were able to reach an
amicable resolution of the dispute. (R. 115 atf 6.)
35.

Later in November, Mr. Sorf called the District's counsel to discuss

resolution. (R. 115 at f 7.) During the telephone conversation, the District's counsel did
not inform Mr. Sorf that he needed to file an Answer. (R. 115 at ^f 9.)
36.

After discussions with the District's counsel, Mr. Sorf was under the

impression that the District would only pursue court action if Mr. Sorf could not reach a
settlement with the District. (R. 115 at | 8.)
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37.

The District's counsel instructed Mr. Sorf to call and speak with the District

directly to discuss resolution. (R. 115 at f 10.) Specifically, Mr. Sorf was instructed to
call Wayne Vinzer and Mike Wilson. (R. 115 at ^f 11.)
38.

Mr. Sorf telephoned both Mr. Vinzer and Mr. Wilson but was unable to

reach them. (R. 115 at ^ 11.)
Default Judgment
39.

Without a hearing on the merits, a default judgment was entered against

Mr. Sorf on December 13, 2010. The default judgment ordered in part as follows:
a.

Defendant shall remove all encroachments not authorized by [the
District] including, but not limited to, rock retaining walls, added fill
material, gazebo, hot tub, two (2) outbuildings, trees, and water
features.

b.

Defendant shall return adequate soils and fill (2' to 3' in depth) on
the south portion of Defendant's Property traversed by the SLA.

f.

Defendant will immediately remove all impediments to access to
[sic] the SLA corridor by [the District] and its contractor(s). This
will be accomplished by installing (at a minimum) access gates with
openings not less than 12 feet in width on the north and south
property lines. If Defendant desires to have a lock on the gate, he
shall make arrangements acceptable to [the District] for locks in
series and allow [the District] to place their own lock, such that [the
District] has access to the SLA corridor at all times.

(R. 97-99.)
40.

If Mr. Sorf does not fully abide by the terms of the default judgment, the

District may remove the described encroachments and seek costs from Mr. Sorf.
If Defendant fails to fully comply with Paragraph 1 immediately above,
[the District] or [the District's] contractor, may move and remove all
12
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described encroaching improvements, and Defendant is hereby enjoined
from interfering with such work. [The District] may seek additional
judgment or judgments for any costs incurred as a result of Defendant's
failure to fully comply with paragraph 1 above.
(R. 99.)
41.

While not mentioned in the District's complaint, the default judgment orders

Mr. Sorf to enter a Cooperation Agreement. (R. 97-99.) The Cooperation Agreement is the
District's unilateral decision as to what they will and will not allow on the land within the
easement area. By demanding Mr. Sorf to enter a Cooperation Agreement, the trial court
in essence approved the extensive rules and regulations imposed by the District nearly 60 years
after the granting of the easement. (R. 460-470.)
Proposed Cooperation Agreement
42.

With regard to Mr. Sorf s use of the SLA Corridor, the Cooperation

Agreement provides:1
The southeast corner of [Mr. Sorf s] home encroaches approximately 4.3
feet onto the SLA corridor, as shown in Exhibit A. In addition and as
depicted in Exhibit A, other improvements exist including, but not limited
to, earthwork (added fill material), turf areas, rock retaining walls (for
landscaping), fencing and access gates, flat work (concrete and rock
pathways), garden boxes, an electrical utility line, a motorcycle barn, an
equipment shed, a gazebo and hot tub, deck, water feature, and trees within
the SLA corridor without prior approval from the District.
All
improvements not expressly approved by this agreement shall be removed
at owner's expense no later than August 30, 2011.
Additional
improvements shall not be constructed within the easement without first
receiving written permission from the District.

On June 28, 2011, after this appeal had been initiated, the District entered a "Notice of Partial Abandonment of
Easement" whereby it abandoned the portion of the easement which is encumbered by Mr. Sorf s existing home.
This abandonment does not significantly change the matters on appeal. Even with the abandonment, the easement
still being claimed by the District exists immediately outside of Mr. Sorf s backdoor and covers the majority of his
backyard. (See Ex. B of Supplemental Record, accepted by the Court on 10/28/11.)

13
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[Mr. Sorf s] use of the SLA corridor shall be limited to the following as
shown on Exhibit A: earthwork (added fill material), turf areas, a rock
retaining wall (for landscaping), the existing fences with three access gates,
flat work (concrete and rock pathways), garden boxes, and an electrical
utility crossing. The existing fences shall be modified to include access
gates within the easement to provide District access.
(R.461.)
43.

The Cooperation Agreement is only good for five (5) years and has a

maximum duration of fifteen (15) years. Renewal of the agreement is not guaranteed.
(R.461.)
44.

Not only does the Cooperation Agreement limit what a property owner can

do with their property within the easement area, it also tells property owners what cannot
be done on property "close" to the easement area.

However, no definition of the word

"close" is provided.
[Mr. Sorf] warrants and agrees that no earthwork, construction work or
other work performed by or for [Mr. Sorf] on the SLA corridor or close
enough to the SLA corridor to present risk to District improvements or
operations will take place except as expressly described in plans and
specifications approved in writing by District. Any modifications to such
plans and specifications must be approved in writing by District.
(R. 463)(emphasis added.)
45.

The Cooperation Agreement provides the District with the authority "to

stop work and require correction of any work, or replacement of any materials, which in
its reasonable judgment does not comply with any term or condition" of the Cooperation
Agreement. (R. 463-464.)
46.

If the District modifies or destroys any of the improvements installed on

Mr. Sorf s property that are within or in "close" proximity to the SLA Corridor, Mr. Sorf
14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

must personally bear the financial implications of such actions. "Applicant accepts all
risks that any or all of Applicant's improvements installed on the SLA corridor may be
modified, destroyed or reconstructed at Applicant's sole cost and expense to
accommodate District's exercise of District rights to use the SLA corridor." (R. 465.)
47.

The Cooperation Agreement can be terminated, for any reason, at the

discretion of either party.

"Either party may, at their sole option, terminate this

Agreement upon ninety (90) days written notice to the other party." (R. 466.)
48.

If a new agreement is not entered before the Cooperation Agreement's

expiration, Mr. Sorf s right to use his property would be forever terminated. "Applicant's
right to use the SLA corridor shall expire completely upon the expiration of the term
described in Article I above, absent a new agreement or written extension signed by both
parties." (R. 466.)
49.

If the Cooperation Agreement is terminated, Mr. Sorf will still be expected

to remove any improvements made to the SLA corridor, restore the SLA corridor
according to District's specifications, and reimburse the District for any costs owed.
The following, as described in this Agreement, shall survive any
termination of this Agreement: (i) All of Applicant's obligations to
reimburse any costs incurred by the District; (ii) All of Applicant's
obligations to remove Applicant's improvements and make restoration . . . .
District will reasonably determine what portion of Applicant's
improvements on the SLA corridor will be removed upon termination of
this Agreement and set a deadline and specifications for removal and
restoration. Such removal and restoration will be at the sole expense of the
Applicant.
(R. 466-467.)
15
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50.

In any dispute relating to the Cooperation Agreement, the District will not

be liable for consequential damages to Mr. Sorf even if the District is found to be at fault.
"Under no circumstances shall District or its officers, trustees or employees be liable for
any consequential damages resulting from interruption of Applicant's use of the SLA
corridor." (R. 467.)
51.

Any rights given to Mr. Sorf in relation to use of the SLA corridor cannot

be assigned or transferred without prior written consent of the District. The District is
under no obligation to approve an assignment or transfer of Mr. Sorf s rights.
Applicant's rights and obligations under this Agreement shall run with the
property . . . . Applicant's rights and obligations may not otherwise be
assigned or transferred by Applicant without the prior written consent of
District, which District is under no obligation to give. Any such attempt to
assign without the prior written consent of District shall be considered null
and void and shall be grounds for termination of this Agreement.
(R. 468.)
Motion to Set Aside Default
52.

On or about January 24, 2011, Mr. Sorf retained the law firm of Strong &

Hanni to help him determine whether a default judgment has been entered against him
and what action, if any, was necessary. (R. 115 at ^f 14.)
53.

On January 24, 2011, Mr. Sorf s counsel received a copy of the Summons

and Complaint from the District's counsel. (R. 115 at f 14.) On January 24, 2011, Mr.
Sorf saw the District's Summons and Complaint for the first time. (R. 115 at ^ 14.)
54.

On January 28, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default

Judgment and supporting memorandum. (R. 104-118.)
16
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55.

On February 3, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a supplement to his Motion to Set

Aside and submitted a proposed Answer to the District's Complaint. (R. 122-134.)
56.

On March 8, 2011, a hearing was held in conjunction with Mr. Sorfs

Motion to Set Aside. {See Hearing Transcript, starting at R. 558.) During the hearing,
Judge Fratto made findings of fact concerning issues of excusable neglect. However,
despite requests from counsel, Judge Fratto did not issue findings of fact concerning
whether Mr. Sorfs failure to timely answer the District's complaint was due to mistake,
surprise or inadvertence.
THE COURT: Yes. Now, I appreciate everyone's presentation. I'm
prepared to make a decision. The matter is in front of me as a motion to set
aside the default judgment. It is a Rule 60(b) motion, pled as a 60(b)
motion. It has two prongs to the analysis. The first is that there must be, in
this case, it appears to me, invoked the excusable neglect. I should set
aside the judgment as a result of excusable neglect . . . . Now, I have some
discretion here, but I think I have a lot of guidance in terms of what is
excusable neglect that would guide me as to what would be the appropriate
exercise of discretion. It appears to me that the law is fairly clear that,
'You've actually served it on someone else who didn't advise me they had
been served' is not excusable neglect....
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could you also address the mistake THE COURT: Yes. Let me finish, and then if there's some questions, I'll
entertain a few of those, but I'm just trying to give you the reasons I'm
going to rule as I'm ruling . . . . And so it seems to me that there's a failure
to show that excusable - that first prong, excusable neglect. And I suppose
I could bring the analysis to a close with that, because without a showing of
excusable neglect, then the matter cannot be set aside. The complaint
cannot be set aside.
—

•

*

-

-

-

•

-

*

*

MR. BELNAP: -- may I ask a question?
THE COURT: Yes.
17
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MR. BELNAP: And I understand your ruling, but the rule also speaks of
mistake and inadvertence, which I understand your analysis of the letter,
but the letter can certainly THE COURT: Well, Mr. Belnap, I'm going to stop you there. I appreciate
the other - and there's other factors in the rule, also, but it appears to me
the only one that would be applicable in this instance and with what
excuses have been given is excusable neglect, and, for the reasons I've
already stated, I do not see that there has been a showing here of excusable
neglect.
(

MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could we talk about the next step here, and
that is THE COURT: I'm going to stop you there, because we're going to have to
do that in another context. We've actually - the next matter, I think, was
scheduled, if I'm correct, at 3:30, and so we've gone well beyond that. I
can only deal with what we've got here in front of me today.
MR. BELNAP: Thank you.
(Hearing transcript at p. 56-63, starting at R. 556.)
57.

Near the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Mr. Sorf offered to pay the

costs incurred by the District in conjunction with obtaining the default judgment.
(Hearing Transcript at p. 55, starting at R. 556.)
58.

On March 17, 2011, the Court entered an order denying Mr. Sorf s Motion

to Set Aside.

Judge Fratto's ruling, in part, was based on the assumption that the

"defenses proffered by [Mr. Sorf] to [the District's] Complaint are not meritorious as a
matter of l a w . . . . " ( R . 353.)
Motion for Stay & Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim
59.

On April 13, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a Motion for Stay of Action to Enforce

Judgment pending appeal. (R. 364-366.)
18
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60.

On April 14, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a Motion for Leave to File a

Counterclaim and supporting memorandum. (R. 374-485.)
61.

On May 9, 2011, oral argument was held on Mr. Sorf s Motion for Leave.

While the judge denied Mr. Sorf s Motion, he explained that the decision was related
only to whether a claim could be raised after a case had gone to judgment. The decision
did not consider whether Mr. Sorf s claim was a compulsory or permissive counterclaim.
The linchpin here, though, seems to be whether this is a compulsory
counterclaim. If it is a compulsory counterclaim to the complaint, then
under our rules, the claim itself may be lost. Of course, thaf s what makes
it - if it's a compulsory counterclaim, then it necessarily must be raised.
But I'm not deciding here whether this is a compulsory counterclaim or not
to be raised in yet another lawsuit, I suppose, or however it may be
appropriately raised. The only thing I'm deciding here is whether you can
raise a claim of any kind with the case in the posture it is in, and that is, it
has gone to a judgment. There's been a request to set that judgment aside.
That has been denied. And I think we can go further with the matter, if you
will, in terms of raising new claims with the case in that posture.
Consequently, and for that reason, your motion is respectfully denied.
(Hearing transcript at p. 32 & 33, starting at R. 557.)
62.

On May 12, 2011, oral argument was held on Mr. Sorf s Motion to Stay

Enforcement of Judgment. In granting Mr. Sorf s Motion to Stay, Judge Fratto pointed
out that he had never ruled on the merits of Mr. Sorf s defenses and that he had never
stated Mr. Sorf s defenses were frivolous. Since the underlying case resulted in default,
neither the merits of the claim nor the merits of the defenses were considered.
In this case I take into account the fact that this is a default judgment. I did,
as part of Mr. Belnap's motion to reconsider this, opine in terms of the whether there was a meritorious defense presented, and there's a distinction
here between a meritorious defense presented at the time of the motion.
That's the only time I can judge it, in relation to the motion, and whether
there is ultimately a meritorious defense. But, in any event, I did not opine
19
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that what was offered were frivolous defenses, so we have a default
judgment in which the merits of the matter have not been determined, and I
cannot find that what has been raised as defenses are frivolous, and it seems
to me that, as I say, that the execution on the judgment results in permanent
- a permanent situation.
(Hearing Transcript at p. 30 & 31, starting at R 558.)
63.

On May 16, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a Notice of Appeal and on May 17,2011,

Mr. Sorf filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R. 542-547.)
64.

On May 17, 2011, the Court entered an Order denying Mr. Sorf s Motion

for Leave to File a Counterclaim. (R. 548.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Sorf s failure to timely file an Answer was due to mistake, surprise,
inadvertence and excusable neglect. A Summons and Complaint was delivered to Mr.
Sorf s home, but not personally served on him. At the same time frame, Mr. Sorf
received a letter from the District soliciting contact and resolution to the dispute. Mr.
Sorf contacted the District to try and facilitate a resolution. He did not understand he had
been sued or that he was required to answer.

Based on written and verbal

communications with the District, Mr. Sorf was under the impression that the District
would not file a lawsuit against him if an agreeable settlement could be reached. Mr.
Sorf s mistaken understanding led directly to the default judgment being entered. It was
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside.
Mr. Sorf-asserted multiple meritorious defenses in response to the District's
Complaint and thus, his Motion to Set Aside should have been granted. Whether it be the
scope of expressive language in the grant of the easement (with after-adopted rules and
20
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regulations), abandonment, or equitable estoppel, Mr. Sorf clearly proffered defenses
that, if proven, would have precluded the injunction and declaratory relief sought by the
District.

The Court's denial of Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside was based on the

improper assumption that Mr. Sorf s defenses were not meritorious as a matter of law.
(R. 353.) Such an assumption was made despite Judge Fratto admitting that Mr. Sorf s
defenses were never actually considered and no determination as to the merits of the
defenses made. {See Hearing Transcript at p. 30 & 31, starting at R. 558.)
The implications of the default judgment are significant to Mr. Sorf. The default
judgment authorizes the District to compel the removal of nearly all improvements from
the easement area and prohibits future installation of improvements. Such extreme use
restrictions are contrary to the expressive language of the easement and are inconsistent
with the District's past use of the easement area. For more than 20 years, the District has
not objected to use of the easement area and has allowed houses, sheds, pools, water
features, tennis courts, patios, gazebos, etc. to be built within the prescribed easement.
Now suddenly, the District is claiming authority over the easement area and demanding
improvements be removed and/or destroyed at the property owner's expense.
The useful purpose and financial value of Mr. Sorf s home is at stake in this
litigation. Accordingly, the potential consequences to Mr. Sorf are too great to allow the
District's authority to be determined through a default judgment entered on a technicality
concerning service of process. Mr. Sorf s failure to timely file an answer was due to
mistake and excusable neglect. Mr. Sorf has asserted meritorious defenses in this case
and thus, his Motion to Set Aside should have been granted. It was an abuse of discretion
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to deny Mr. Sorf the opportunity to have the District's allegations and his defenses
considered on the merits.
The trial court also erred in denying Mr. Sorf s Motion to Leave to File a
Counterclaim. Mr. Sorf s counterclaim for inverse condemnation was not acquired until
after the default judgment was entered and finalized with denial of the Motion to Set
Aside. The default judgment defined the District's rights and authorities in relation to
Mr. Sorf s property. (R. 456 at Tf 1.) The default gave the District the power to demand
Mr. Sorf permanently remove various structures and items from his property. (R. 456 at
f 1.) The Default Judgment also demands Mr. Sorf enter a Cooperation Agreement with
the District. (R. 458 at f 1.) The Cooperation Agreement imposes yet further restrictions
and requirements on Mr. Sorf s property. (R. 460-470.) In light of the magnitude of the
rights and authorities provided to the District in the default judgment, Mr. Sorf is
deprived of all useful purpose of his backyard.

The terms of the default judgment

constitute a taking sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an inverse condemnation
action.
The default judgment constitutes a final decision as to the authority the District
has over Mr. Sorf s property. Prior to entry of default, the District's rights had not been
defined and there was no way to determine if the alleged regulations and claimed
authority went too far as to constitute a taking. Mr. Sorf s inverse condemnation claim
did not ripen until default was finalized with denial of the Motion to Set Aside.
Mr. Sorf s inverse condemnation counterclaim is not compulsory in nature. In
order to be compulsory, the counterclaim must have existed at the time Mr. Sorf s
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pleading was served. The taking in this case did not occur until default was finalized on
March 17, 2011 with denial of the Motion to Set Aside. By then, Mr. Sorf s proposed
Answer had already been filed. Mr. Sorf did not have a claim for inverse condemnation
when he filed his pleading and thus, the counterclaim cannot be compulsory.
Just because default was entered as to the claims filed by the District, that should
not mean that Mr. Sorf is out of luck with regard to claims that arose subsequent to the
default judgment. Mr. Sorf should not be stripped of his fundamental rights to seek
redress of later injuries simply because he made a mistake in not timely answering the
District's Complaint.

Mr. Sorf s claims for inverse condemnation are separate and

subsequent to the issues addressed in the default judgment. The default judgment should
not act as a bar to Mr. Sorf s inverse condemnation claims.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MR. SORF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.

When considering a motion to set aside a default judgment, the trial court should
"incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
hearing." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, \ 10 (Utah 2000.)

Moreover, "it is quite

uniformly regarded an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely
application is made to set aside." Id. at \ 11 (citation omitted.)
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1.

Mr. Sorf s Failure to Timely Respond to the Complaint was Due
to Mistake, Surprise, Inadvertence or Excusable Neglect. The
Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings of Fact as to All
of the Rule 60(b) Reasons Proferred by Mr. Sorf.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides that in the furtherance of justice a
court may set aside a judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect." "[I]f default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where,
absence such mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity side of the court
should grant relief." May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984). The trial
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside because Mr.
Sorf clearly showed that his failure to timely respond to the District's Complaint was due
to mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect. Mr. Sorf did not receive the
papers that were delivered to his house in October 2010 because they were served on a
woman at the home who did not accept them.
Mr. Sorf received a letter from the District's counsel. While the letter indicated
that a Summons and Complaint were enclosed, no such documents were actually there.
(R. 114 at 1fl[ 3 & 4; R. 118.) The letter indicated that the District was willing to discuss
an "amicable resolution" to the matter. (R. 118.) The letter led Mr. Sorf to believe that
the District wanted to discuss an amicable resolution prior to serving him with a
complaint. (R. 115 at ^ 6.)
In response to the District's letter, Mr. Sorf made a diligent effort to contact the
District to discuss resolution. Mr. Sorf telephoned the District's attorney. (R. 115 at | 7.)
During that conversation, the District's counsel did not inform Mr. Sorf that he needed to
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answer. (R. 115 at f 9.) Instead, the District's counsel told Mr. Sorf to call the District
directly to discuss a resolution. (R. 115 at | 10.) Mr. Sorf was given the names and
telephone numbers to two individuals employed by the District. (R. 115 at | 11.) After
the telephone conversation with counsel, Mr. Sorf was under the impression that the
District would not serve a complaint against him if a settlement could be reached. (R. 115
at f 8.)

After the telephone call with the District's attorney, Mr. Sorf called the two

District employees pursuant to the District's counsel's direction. Unfortunately, Mr. Sorf
was unable to reach the employees. (R. 115 at f 11.)
Thereafter, Mr. Sorf received default judgment papers. Mr. Sorf had not been
served with a complaint and so he did not understand what the default judgment papers
meant. (R. 115 at Tf 12.) Mr. Sorf contacted counsel in order to determine what action, if
any, was necessary. On January 24, 2011, Mr. Sorf learned for the first time that a
default judgment had been entered against him.

He also saw the Summons and

Complaint for the first time on that date. (R. 115 at f 14.) Four days later, on January
28, 2011, Mr. Sorf filed a Motion to Set Aside the default judgment. (R. 104.)
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the default against Mr. Sorf was
entered due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect. Mr. Sorf did not
see the District's Summons or Complaint prior to default being entered. Since he had not
been personally served, Mr. Sorf had no reason to believe a default judgment could be
entered against him. Based on written and verbal communications from the District, Mr.
Sorf was led to believe that the District wanted to discuss an amicable resolution prior to
serving him with the complaint. Mr. Sorf mistakenly believed that he had an opportunity
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to engage in settlement discussions with the District prior to a legal action being filed.
As soon as Mr. Sorf became aware of the default judgment, he retained legal counsel and
promptly initiated efforts to set aside the default aside.
The events of this case are analogous to Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000).
In Lund, Kurtis Lund and B&B Drywall failed to respond to Brown's counterclaim and
thus, default was entered. Lund and B&B argued that the default "should be vacated
under the 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect' prong of rule 60 because
they believed the[ir] bankruptcy case stayed any further actions regarding their complaint
or the counterclaim." Id. at 279.

Brown countered that the bankruptcy stay did not

apply to the counterclaim and did not prohibit a declaratory judgment. The trial court
explained that while Lund and B&B were mistaken in their understanding of the
bankruptcy stay, they had shown "reasonable justification or excuse" for their failure to
reply to the counterclaim. Accordingly, the trial court's decision denying Lunds' motion
to vacate the default judgment was reversed.
For rule 60(b) purposes, it is enough to state that there is substantial support
for Lund's and B&B's interpretation of bankruptcy law. In other words,
under rule 60(b), Lund and B&B need not show that their interpretation of
bankruptcy law is legally correct, but merely that they possessed a
reasonable, good faith belief that the bankruptcy stay was effective against
the Browns' counterclaim.
Id. at 280 (emphasis added.)
Just like in Lund, Mr. Sorf had a reasonable, good faith belief that a judgment
would not be entered against him. Mr. Sorf did not believe that a lawsuit had been filed
and thus, did not understand how a default judgment could be entered. Written and
26
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verbal communications with the District's counsel provided substantial support for Mr.
Sorf s belief that the District was negotiating an amicable resolution of the dispute before
filing suit. The fact that Mr. Sorf s belief was ultimately incorrect is of no significance.
Mr. Sorf s mistaken belief was reasonable and made in good faith. In hindsight, one can
say that Mr. Sorf should have done things differently. However, that is exactly why Rule
60(b) exists (i.e. to provide protection from the harsh effects of a default judgment that
was entered due to a mistaken belief). Like in Lund, the circumstances in this matter
warrant that Mr. Sorf be given his day in court. The trial court abused its discretion when
it denied Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside.
The trial court further abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Sorf s Motion to
Set Aside because it failed to support the denial with adequate findings of fact. A court's
ruling on a motion to set aside "must be 'based on adequate findings of fact' and 'on the
law.'" Lund, 11 P.3d at 279 (citing May, 677 P.2d at 1110). In Hernandez v. Baker, 104
P.3d 664 (Utah App. 2004), the trial court entered default judgments against Baker and
Performance Auto after they failed to file an answer to Hernandez' complaint. Baker and
Performance Auto argued that the default should be set aside because it was entered
against them through excusable neglect, that their motion to set aside was timely and that
they had meritorious defenses to the action. Id. at 666. The trial court made a ruling as
to whether meritorious defenses were present, but failed to address whether the motion to
set aside was timely or whether sufficient explanation under Rule 60(b) had been given.
A court may 'relieve a party . . . from a final judgment' because of
'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.' Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b). To obtain relief from a default judgment, a defendant must show: (i)
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'that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or
any other reason specified in rule 60(b)Y (ii) 'that his motion to set aside
the judgment was timely/ and (iii) 'that he has a meritorious defense to the
action.'
Id. (citing Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1994)(emphasis added.) On appeal, Baker argued that because the trial court did not
make a ruling as to timeliness and grounds under Rule 60(b), the appellate court should
simply assume the factors had been met.

Id. The appellate court rejected Baker's

argument and remanded the case "to determine whether Baker satisfied the rule 60(b)
reason [proffered] and the timeliness requirement."

Id. at 668. While Baker only

asserted excusable neglect to explain his inactions, the appellate court pointed out that
adequate findings of fact must be made as to "any . . . reason specified in rule 60(b)." Id.
at 666.
Just like in Hernandez, the trial court's denial of Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside
was based on inadequate findings of fact. In his Motion to Set Aside, Mr. Sorf argued
that default was entered against him due to "mistake, surprise, inadvertence and
excusable neglect."

(R. 106-118 & R. 274-339)(emphasis added.)

However, Judge

Fratto only made a factual finding as to whether excusable neglect was present. Judge
Fratto did not issue findings of fact with regard to mistake, surprise or inadvertence.
(Hearing transcript at pp. 56-63, starting at R. 556.) As such, Judge Fratto did not fully
address the reasons why default was entered against Mr. Sorf. At the relevant hearing,
counsel for Mr. Sorf specifically asked Judge Fratto to make a determination as to
whether mistake and/or inadvertence reasonably explained why default had been entered
28
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against Mr. Sorf. Judge Fratto declined counsel's request. (Hearing transcript at pp. .59
& 62, starting at R. 556.) As such, no findings of fact were made as to mistake, surprise
or inadvertence. Judge Fratto's actions were improper and an abuse of discretion. Judge
Fratto had a duty to make findings and rulings as to all of the Rule 60(b) reasons
proffered by Mr. Sorf. Since he did not, this matter must be remanded to the trial court to
make findings and rulings as to whether the default judgment was entered against Mr.
Sorf because of mistake, surprise or inadvertence. The trial court's denial of Mr. Sorf s
Motion to Set Aside was an abuse of discretion.
2.

Mr. Sorf Has Demonstrated Meritorious Defenses to the
Underlying Action.

Rule 60(b) provides that "a court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party .
. . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)(6). Such relief is warranted
when the moving party has demonstrated a "meritorious defense" to the underlying
action.
We have held that relief from judgment requires a showing of a meritorious
defense to a claim. The purpose of the meritorious defense rule is 'to
prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the fact of
the pleadings, are frivolous. The rule requires the party seeking to set aside
a judgment to 'show' that he or she 'has a meritorious defense to the
action.'
Lund, 11 P.3d 277, 283 (Utah 2000) (citing Erickson v. Schenkers Int 7 Forwarders Inc.,
882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994).) In making an adequate showing of a meritorious
defense, the "party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard."
Id. The party need only "present[] a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if
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proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant
Id
The trial court's denial of Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside was based, in part, on
the assumption that the "defenses proffered by [Mr. Sorf] to [the District's] Complaint
are not meritorious as a matter of law . . . ." (R. 353)(emphasis added.) The trial
court's assumption was an abuse of discretion because Mr. Sorf did actually assert
several meritorious defenses.

In fact, the existence of meritorious defenses was

contemplated by Judge Fratto during a hearing on May 12, 2011. The May 12 hearing
took place after Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside had been denied. At the May 12 hearing,
contrary to what is stated in the Order, Judge Fratto stated that no consideration of
defenses had been done and that no determination as to the merits of Mr. Sorf s defenses
made. {See Hearing Transcript at p. 30 & 31, starting at R 558.) If the trial court had
properly considered Mr. Sorf s defenses, it would have quickly recognized their merits.
Mr. Sorf has asserted multiple meritorious defenses.

Therefore, it was an abuse of

discretion to deny his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
Mr. Sorf s proposed Answer, satisfied the meritorious defense requirement
because, if proven, would have precluded recovery by the District. Below is a detailed
analysis of the valid meritorious defenses asserted by Mr. Sorf.
a.

The District's Regulations Exceed the Express Language of
the Easement.

Mr. Sorf s first affirmative defense in his proposed Answer was that the District's
restrictions and regulations for use of the SLA easement far exceed the express language
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and the intended use of the easement.

(R. 125.) Utah law provides that the rights

founded on an easement created by a deed are limited to the uses and extent fixed by the
instrument. See Gillmore v. Macey, 2005 UT App. 351. Utah law further provides that
"an easement holder has the right to make incidental uses beyond the express easement. .
. if those uses are made in a reasonable manner and they do not cause unnecessary injury
to the servient owners." Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, Tf 21.
In this case, the deed conveying the SLA easement explicitly limits the easement
to: " . . . a perpetual easement to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain a pipeline or
pipelines on, over and across . . . ." (Ex. 3 attached to complaint.) The default judgment
entered against Mr. Sorf permits the District to exercise rights not granted, or even
contemplated, by the easement. Specifically, the default judgment ordered Mr. Sorf to
remove multiple improvements, modify soil levels, and install large gates that serve to
provide the District with access to Mr. Sorf s property.

(R. 97-99.) After default was

entered, the District created a "Proposed Plan of Action" which provided, among other
things, that the District would, on Mr. Sorf s property, relocate trees, disconnect utilities
from a barn, move the barn, add fill material on south side, grade the land, remove a
retaining wall, shed, water feature, rock wall, fill material, concrete pad, utility crossing,
gazebo, hot tub, deck and garden boxes and then send invoices for costs to Mr. Sorf. (R.
399.) The SLA easement does not prohibit Mr. Sorf, or any other landowner, from
installing improvements nor does it authorize the District to compel the removal of
improvements. As such, it is Mr. Sorf s position that the authority granted through the
default judgment dramatically exceeds the express language of the easement.
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If the regulations being imposed by the District as a result of the default judgment
exceed the express language of the easement, the District's right to recovery would be
limited and/or destroyed. As such, the first affirmative defense in Mr. Sorf s proposed
Answer is meritorious.
b.

The Easement Has Been at Least Partially Abandoned by the
District.

Mr. Sorf has asserted meritorious defenses concerning the District's abandonment
of the SLA easement. {See R. 125-134 at Affirmative Defenses 3 & 4.) According to
Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192, it is the role of court to decide if an easement has been
abandoned. In Lunt, the court held that a "history of non-use, coupled with an act or
omission showing a clear intent to abandon" is sufficient to show abandonment. Id. at
Tf25. In Lunt, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision that there was a
partial abandonment of an easement because of a portion of the easement had not been
used within the past twenty years, a gate had been constructed blocking that portion of
the easement from being used, and Lunt had acquiesced in the closure by never taking
any action to object. Id. at ^} 27-29.
Just like in Lunt, the District's lack of activity for the past several decades in
conjunction with the easement constitutes an abandonment. The easement at issue has
been in place since 1942.

Between 1942 and 2010, homes, patios, sheds, trees,

swimming pools, tennis courts, etc. were allowed to be erected on the easement. Now
suddenly, without there being any change in the easement language, the District is
claiming that homeowners cannot have any physical structures on the easement and that
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the District can restrict all improvements to the easement area. The District's right to
restrict surface improvements was abandoned by the inaction of the last 64 years in
permitting permanent physical structures to be built on the easement. As such, there is a
strong likelihood that principals of abandonment would meritoriously defend against the
District's allegations.
c.

Equitable Estoppel

Mr. Sorf has also asserted meritorious defenses concerning equitable estoppel.
{See R. 125-134 at Affirmative Defense 5 & 6.) Utah courts have stated the equitable
estoppel is applicable to governmental entities "in unusual circumstances where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah App. 1990)(citations omitted.) The Eldredge court further commented
that "the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception."
Id. (citations omitted.)
Equitable estoppel is applicable to this case because the facts establish with
certainty that Mr. Sorf relied upon statements from the District's employees that his
landscaping was appropriate. Mr. Sorf will suffer significant financial and physical loss
if the District is permitted to tear apart his backyard. "Where a public official, acting,
within his authority and with knowledge of the pertinent facts, has made a commitment
and the party to whom it was made has acted to his detriment in reliance on that
commitment, the official should not be permitted to revoke that commitment." Id. at 676
(citation omitted.)
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In Eldredge, the Utah State Retirement Board had authority to set up the plaintiffs
retirement and grant him prior service credit. Because the plaintiff relied thereon to his
substantial detriment, the Eldredge court held that the Board could not disavow its
representations. Id, at 676. Similarly, Mr. Sorf relied upon the representations of District
employees concerning the placement of his landscaping. Further, for more than sixty
years, the District and/or its predecessors-in-interest allowed Mr. Sorf and other adjoining
landowners to install houses, patios, concrete pads, sheds, pools, trees and other
improvements on the easement. Since use restrictions had not been imposed in the past,
it was reasonable for Mr. Sorf to believe that his recent landscaping improvements were
appropriate. To this date, large tree, buildings, houses and other structures dot the SLA
easement throughout the Salt Lake Valley. Moreover, the District did not instruct Mr.
Sorf to stop landscaping until approximately two days prior to completion. District's
employees led Mr. Sorf to believe that his landscaping was not a threat to the SLA
pipeline.

Mr. Sorf relied upon the District's verbal assurances in completing his

landscaping. As such, there is a strong likelihood that principals of equitable estoppel
would meritoriously defend against the District's allegations.
This case has critical financial and personal implication on Mr. Sorf. This is not a
matter that should be decided pursuant to a default judgment entered on a technicality
concerning service of process. The District's allegations need to be considered, analyzed
and resolved on the merits. The trial court failed to consider the multiple meritorious
defenses that Mr. Sorf set forth in this matter. The trial court abused its discretion when
it denied Mr. Sorf s Motion to Set Aside.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. SORF'S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM.

The trial court erred in denying Mr. Sorf s Motion for Leave to file a
counterclaim. A trial court's ruling on a motion for leave is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness with no clear deference given to the trial court. See Harmon,
910 P.2d at 1199. When a counterclaim matures or is acquired after initial pleadings, the
counterclaim can be presented through supplemental pleading with permission of the
court. "A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his
pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by
supplemental pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d). Mr. Sorf s counterclaim for inverse
condemnation was not acquired until after the default judgment was entered and finalized
with denial of the Motion to Set Aside. Mr. Sorf s claim for inverse condemnation is
dependent on the existence of a taking. A taking did not occur in this case until the
District's rights and authorities over Mr. Sorf s property were determined and finalized as
set forth in the Order dated March 17, 2011. The trial court's denial of Mr. Sorf s Motion
for Leave was incorrect and thus, should be overturned.
1.

For Purposes of Inverse Condemnation, There Was No Taking
of Mr. Sorf s Property Until the Default Judgment Was
Finalized.

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." If private property is
"taken or damaged for public use without a formal exercise of the eminent domain
power, the property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action . . . to recover the
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value of the property." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d
1241, 1243 (Utah, 1990). An inverse condemnation action requires the showing of three
elements: (1) property, (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public use. Id.
The first element of an inverse condemnation action is clearly satisfied in this
case. Considering the nature of eligible property in relation to an inverse condemnation
claim, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "The kinds of property subject to the [eminent
domain] r i g h t . . . is practically unlimited." Id. Property "includes, but is not limited to,
land and improvements subject to the substantive law of real property." Id. The property
at issue in this case is the land and residence owned by Mr. Sorf at 9625 South Mt. Jordan
Road in Sandy, Utah. (R. 457 at Tf 1.) Mr. Sorf s land and residence are referred to as
"Defendant's Property" in the default judgment.

{See generally R. 456-458.)

The

District, by and through counsel, drafted the terms of the default judgment. As such, the
parties have recognized, and there is no dispute, that private property is at issue.
It is also clearly obvious that the District's actions are for a "public use" and thus,
the third element of an inverse condemnation claim is satisfied. In Farmers the Utah
Supreme Court stated that, "It is universally conceded that the government has the power
to take private property in the interest of the public health and safety." 803 P.2d at 1245.
The easement rights being claimed by the District in this case relate directly to the
existence and operation of the SLA. In filing a complaint, the District sought to have its
rights under the SLA easement defined for the benefit of the public.
The final element of Mr. Sorf s inverse condemnation claim (i.e. the taking or
damages) was acquired when the default judgment was finalized with denial of the
36
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Motion to Set Aside. The default judgment defined the District's rights and authorities in
relation to Mr. Sorf s property, including the right and power to remove improvements.
(R. 456 at f 1.)

The default judgment gives the District the power to demand Mr. Sorf

permanently remove various structures and items from his property including, but not
limited to, a rock retaining wall, added fill material, a gazebo, a hot tub, two outbuildings,
trees and water features. (R. 456 at f 1.) The default judgment demands that once the
improvements are removed, Mr. Sorf must also "return adequate soils and fills (2' to 3' in
depth) on the south portion of [his] property traversed by the SLA." (R. 457 at ^f 1(b).)
Further, the default judgment requires Mr. Sorf to install "access gates with openings not
less than 12 feet in width on the north and south property lines" so that the District "has
access to the SLA corridor at all times." (R. 457 at f 1(f).) If Mr. Sorf desires to lock the
access gate, he has to make "arrangements acceptable to [the District]" and "allow [the
District] to place their own lock." (R. 457 at | 1(f).) If Mr. Sorf does not fully abide by
the terms of the default judgment, the District may remove the described encroachments
and seek costs from Mr. Sorf. (R. 458 at ^f 2.) Mr. Sorf is not allowed to make any
subsequent improvements to his property without the prior approval of the District.
The District's rights as established by the default judgment dramatically extend
beyond anything ever contemplated by the original easement. The terms of the default
judgment mirror the extensive rules and regulations that were unilaterally created by the
District after the easement was granted. When the easement was initially granted, the
District had unimproved and barren land. Now, 60 years later, the District is in essence
strangling homeowners with rules prohibiting all use of the easement area. Even though
37
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the District abandoned the portion of the easement concerning Mr. Sorf s house, the
District is still restricting all use of Mr. Sorf s property and all subsequent owner's use of
the property.
Neither the original easement nor the District's complaint contemplated any sort
of "Cooperation Agreement." Nonetheless, the District included in the default judgment
the requirement that Mr. Sorf enter into such an agreement. The Cooperation Agreement
proposed by the District imposes yet further restrictions and requirements on Mr. Sorf s
use of his property. (R. 460-470.) The Cooperation Agreement gives the District the
discretion to set construction standards on the development of improvements and to
define how improvements are maintained. (R. 463-464.) The Cooperation Agreement
can be terminated by either party for any reason at any time. (R. 466.) The Cooperation
Agreement must be renewed every five years, but renewal is left to the discretion of the
District. (R. 461.) There is no guarantee that the agreement will be renewed. At a
maximum, the Cooperation Agreement is good for 15 years. (R. 461.) There is no clear
explanation in the agreement as to what happens at the end of the 15 years. However, the
agreement does explicitly state that upon expiration of its terms, Mr. Sorf s right of use
"shall expire completely." (R. 461.) Accordingly, the agreement implies that Mr. Sorf s
right to use will abruptly end 15 years after signing the Cooperation Agreement, if not
sooner. Such restrictions are imposed on Mr. Sorf without any just compensation.
The SLA easement encompasses the majority of Mr. Sorf s property behind his
home. (R. 432.) In light of the magnitude of rights and authorities provided to the
District in the default judgment, Mr. Sorf is deprived of all useful purpose of his
38
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backyard. Mr. Sorf has to permanently remove all of the landscaping and structures that
he paid for and that were created for his enjoyment.

Any future use of Mr. Sorf s

backyard is left to the discretion and restriction of the District.
Any rights given to Mr. Sorf for non-district use of the SLA corridor are nonassignable and non-transferable. (R. 468.) Further, the District is under no obligation
and there is no guarantee that the District will grant non-district use rights to a subsequent
owner of Mr. Sorf s home. (R. 468.) Therefore, Mr. Sorf s ability to sell his home has
been dramatically diminished, if not completely destroyed, as a result of the default
judgment. No reasonable buyer will purchase a home that is subject to the extreme use
regulations imposed by the default judgment and Cooperation Agreement.
In summary, the default judgment and Cooperation Agreement demand Mr. Sorf
to remove, at his expense, extensive landscaping and multiple physical structures that Mr.
Sorf personally paid for and that have been in place for years. Additionally, Mr. Sorf
must enter a Cooperation Agreement giving the District further authority to regulate and
restrict the usage of his property. The injuries imposed by the default judgment are
physical in nature, permanent and continuous. The terms of the default judgment as
applied to Mr. Sorf constitutes a taking sufficient to satisfy the second element of an
inverse condemnation action.
2.

Mr, Sorf s Inverse Condemnation Claim Did Not Ripen Until
the Default Judgment Was Finalized With Denial of the Motion
to Set Aside.

Asserting a claim for inverse condemnation prior to fmalization of the default
judgment would have been premature. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that inverse
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condemnation actions are proper after a taking has occurred. "In Utah, the appropriate
post-taking remedy is an inverse condemnation action

" Patterson v. American

Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 477 (Utah 2003) (emphasis added). Multiple courts outside of
Utah have directly addressed the issue of when an inverse condemnation claim becomes
ripe. Such courts have consistently held that there must be a final determination as to
governmental rights before a taking has occurred and before an inverse condemnation
claim can be asserted.
In Droste v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Pitkin, 85 P.3d 585
(Colo. App. 2003), plaintiffs owned 926 acres of land in Pitkin County. In 1974, Pitkin
County adopted a zoning resolution that allowed development of single family residences
on plaintiffs property. In 1975, Pitkin County established a permit system for new
development in natural resource areas. In 1996, plaintiffs sold a conservation easement
on the property to Pitkin County. In 1999, plaintiffs sold another conservation easement
to Snowmass Village and Pitkin County. In 2000, plaintiffs filed an application to build a
15,000 square foot family residence on their property. Following hearings, the county
denied the application. The Pitkin County Board of Commissioners determined that the
denial did not constitute a taking. Plaintiffs filed suit and argued that the provision
vesting the County Board of Commissioners with the authority to make takings
determinations was unconstitutional and thus, the determination was void. In analyzing
this issue, the court held:
Under the ripeness doctrine, courts usually do not consider disputes
involving uncertain or contingent future matters. A taking claim is ripe if
the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has
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reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue and determination whether a taking has occurred
cannot be made until a court knows the extent of permitted
development on the land in question . . . . An inverse condemnation
claim based on assertions that government regulations constitute a
taking is not ripe until a final determination has been made concerning
the uses to which the property may be put.
Id. at 591 (citations omitted)(emphasis added.)
Further, m Williams v. City of Central 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995), the
plaintiff asserted claims for regulatory taking and inverse condemnation arising from a
moratorium on development imposed by Central City on its gaming district. Plaintiff
alleged that the moratorium preventing him from repairing or rebuilding his property (i.e.
the Belvidere Theatre) and thus, resulting in a compensable taking. The trial court
concluded that the inverse condemnation claim was not ripe.

The appellate court

affirmed the trial court decision and explained:
A claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the government has
executed a permanent regulatory taking is not ripe until a final
decision has been made as to the uses to which the property may be
put. Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo.
App. 1993); Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d
91, 94 (Colo. App. 1993) (a "court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone ?too farf unless it knows how far the regulation
goes"). Williams does not dispute that the moratorium has been repealed.
Neither does he assert that he has been denied a permit to conduct any
economically viable activity at the Belvidere Theater. Therefore, his claim
for inverse condemnation, to the extent that it is based on a permanent
regulatory taking, is not ripe for review.
Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
Finalization of the default judgment resulted in the ripening of Mr. Sorf s inverse
condemnation claim.

The default judgment constitutes a "final decision" as to the
41
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authority the District has over Mr. Sorf s property. Prior to fmalization of the default
judgment, the District's rights had not been defined and thus, there was no way to
determine if the District's authority went too far as to constitute a taking. If the district
court had set aside the default judgment, then the determination of the District's rights to
Mr. Sorf s property would still be at issue and there would be no taking. Mr. Sorf s
inverse condemnation claim was not ripe until the default judgment defined the uses to
which his property can, and more importantly cannot, be put.

Raising an inverse

condemnation claim prior to entry of and fmalization of the default judgment would have
been premature.
3.

Mr. Sorf s Claims Against the District Are After-Acquired
Counterclaims, Not Compulsory Counterclaims.

Mr. Sorf should not be stripped of his fundamental rights to seek redress of an
injury simply because default was entered on earlier issues. Mr. Sorf s claims for inverse
condemnation are separate and subsequent to the issues addressed in the default and did
not mature until default was finalized with denial of the Motion to Set Aside.

Mr. Sorf s

claims for inverse condemnation do not question the matters decided in the default but
rather look at the implications of the regulations imposed on his property as a result
thereof. The trial court's denial of the Motion for Leave stripped Mr. Sorf of the right to
assert a claim that was not even acquired until the default was finalized.

Such

implications are fundamentally unfair.
The impact of the default judgment simply cannot be that Mr. Sorf has lost his
claims for inverse condemnation. The inverse condemnation claims did not mature until
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the default was finalized with denial of the Motion to Set Aside. Accordingly, after the
court denied the Motion to Set Aside, it was entirely proper for Mr. Sorf to move for
leave to file a counterclaim that arises out of the same facts, that concerns the same
parties, and that was acquired as a result of the default judgment. The procedural steps
taken by Mr. Sorf following the default judgment are essentially the same steps that
would have been taken had an answer been filed, the District's complaint considered on
the merits, and a decision entered ruling that the District's regulations were enforceable.
In such a situation, the Court's decision enforcing the rules and regulations would have
constituted a taking for purposes of an inverse condemnation claim. At that point, Mr.
Sorf would have requested leave to file an inverse condemnation counterclaim. The fact
that default was entered on the District's complaint rather than a decision on the merits
should have no impact on what happens next (i.e. that Mr. Sorf requests leave to file an
inverse condemnation counterclaim).
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

/
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Sorf respectfully requests that the decisions of
the trial court denying his Motion to Set Aside and Motion for Leave to File an AfterAcquired Counterclaim be reversed.
DATED this / ^ d a v of November, 2011.
STRONC

Paul M. Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Jennifer R. Carrizal
Attorneys for Appellant Zdenek Sorf
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCPRule60

(2011)

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order
(a) Clerical mistakes. — Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. — On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
HISTORY: Amended effective April 1, 1998
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4)
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule. The
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules permitting service by means other
than personal service.
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. - A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subjectmatter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment
or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the
pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. — A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. - A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery
sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. -- A claim which either matured or was acquired by the
pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. — When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. — A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. - When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. ~ Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance with the
terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
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(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. -- When cross demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the
two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit
thereof by the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. ~ Except as otherwise provided by law as to negotiable instruments and assignments
of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at
the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 2001
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. ~ Subdivisions (a) to (h) of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 13, F.R.C.P.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By.
B0*>utycierfc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff,

;
;)
)
;)

Defendant.

]
)
]
)
)

v.
ZDENEK SORF,

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Civil No. 100921025
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ("Motion") came before the Court on
March 8, 2011 at 2:30 p.m.
Defendant Zdenek Sorf appeared through counsel, Paul M, Belnap.
Plaintiff Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lalce & Sandy appeared through counsel,
Shawn E. Draney and Scott H. Martin.
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Based on the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented, the Court
orders as follows:
1.

Based on the Court's finding that Defendant was properly served with the

Complaint and Summons, that Defendant has not made an adequate showing of excusable
neglect, mistake, or inadvertence in his failure to respond to the Complaint, and that those
defenses proffered by Defendant to Plaintiffs Complaint are not meritorious as a matter of law
under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined easement, its prior federal ownership, and
Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of the state, the Court hereby denies Defendant's
Motion.
2.

The Default Judgment entered December 13, 2010 by this Court remains in full

force and effect.
SO ORDERED this I T day of March, 2C
&

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I served the attached [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT upon the party listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed via first class
U.S. Mail to:
Paul Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Casey W. Jones
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf

#S

DATED, this /<? day of March, 2011.

16002-62 1687687vl
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. SALT ^K6C0l»Jl

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff,

;
;)
)
])

Defendant.

]
)
"
)
]

v.
ZDENEK SORF,

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE COUNTERCLAIM
C M No. 100921025
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim ("Motion7') came before the Court on
May 9,2011 at 2:00 p.m.
Defendant Zdenek Sorf appeared through counsel, Paul M. Belnap and Bradley Bowen.
Plaintiff Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy appeared through counsel,
Shawn E. Draney and Scott H. Martin.
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Based on the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented, the Court
orders as follows:
Based on the Court's finding that URCP, Rule 13(d) does not allow for leave tofilea
post-judgment counterclaim absent an order of the Court reopening of the judgment, the
Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion.
SO ORDERED tins Lf5ay of May, 2011.
BY'

>aul M, Belnap
Counsel for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I served the attached [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COUNTERCLAIM upon the party listed below by placmg
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed viafirstclass
U.S. Mail, and by courtesy e-mail to:
Paul Belnap
Bradley Win. Bowen
Casey W. Jones
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf
DATED this 10th day of May, 201L
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